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Abstract 
This paper examines the governance-“education quality” nexus in a panel of 49 sub-Saharan 
African countries over the period 2000-2012. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Quantile 
regression (QR) are employed as estimation strategies. The following findings are 
established. First, from the OLS, governance variables are negatively correlated with poor 
education quality. Second, with regards to QR, about half of the governance dynamics are not 
significantly correlated with poor education quality in the lowest quantile of poor education 
quality. With the exception of corruption-control, the other governance dynamics are 
negatively correlated with poor education quality in a non-monotonic pattern. 
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This study on the role of governance in quality education in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is 
motivated by three main factors in scholarly and policy-making circles, notably: the high rate 
of education exclusion in the region3; the relevance of governance in development outcomes 
and the gaps in the attendant literature.  
First, the quality of education in SSA has been found to be comparatively low when 
compared to other regions of the world (see Antoninis 2017). As recently documented by 
Antoninis (2017), compared to other regions of the world, the educational standards in Africa 
are far below the global average. This is notably because, inter alia: about ninety percent of 
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young people lack reading skills and approximately twenty-five per cent of the youth in the 
sub-region cannot read properly. According to the narrative, the policy syndrome of low 
academic standards represents a policy concern in the attainment of Sustainable Development 
Goal (SDG) 4 of global education4.  
 Second, good governance has been documented to be relevant in the achievement of 
many positive development outcomes notably: external flows such as foreign direct 
investment and remittances (Ajide and Raheem 2016a, 2016b; Ajide et al. 2020), 
enhancement of social change (Efobi 2015), improved management of the elderly population 
(Fonchingong 2014) and better allocation of economic resources (Anyanwu and Erhijakpor  
2014; Fosu 2015a, 2015b).  This research aims to extend this strand of the literature by 
assessing the importance of governance in quality education. This positioning is also 
motivated by the gaps in the extant literature.  
 Third, the extant contemporary literature on boosting education in Africa has focused 
on inter alia: the effectiveness of education intervention schemes (Conn 2017); PhD by 
Publication as an alternative strategy for increasing the productive value of doctoral 
dissertations in Africa (Asongu and Nwachukwu 2018a), critical insights into country-
specific education quality (Mosha 2018) and the relevance of institutional governance in the 
management of higher educational systems in SSA (Abugre 2018). Moreover, as covered in 
Section 2.2, the extant literature on the nexus between governance and education has largely 
focused on higher education and other world regions (Materu 2007; Coates 2010; Bloom et 
al. 2005; Henard and Mitterle 2010; Dao 2015; Logli 2016; Yirdaw 2016).  
 The closest study in the literature to the present research is Abugre (2018). The study 
has investigated the challenges and development of higher education in SSA. The author uses 
the University of Ghana as a case study and does a thorough qualitative interview of heads of 
departments, directors and deans of the university. The purpose of the study is to explore and 
identify potential setbacks in infrastructure deficiency and institutional policies in the 
country. The results reveal that the following are critical factors that are hampering higher 
education academic development, namely: teaching overloads, congestion of students in 
academic facilities and the absence of research facilities. The author recommends better 
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governance policies as a means of improving the institutional framework of higher education 
in the country.   
 Our research is similar to Abugre (2018) on two main fronts. On the one hand, the 
“pupil to teacher” ratio used to measure poor educational quality is consistent with one of the 
factors identified as an impediment to the production value of higher education, notably: 
congestion of students in academic facilities. On the other hand, we are assessing how 
government affects the quality of education in the light of the policy recommendation from 
Abugre (2018). Hence, by exploring the relevance of six governance dynamics in the quality 
of primary education, the present research is broadly in line with the policy recommendation.  
 On the distinctive features between our research and Abugre (2018), the following are 
worthwhile. First, we are focusing on all sub-Saharan African countries as opposed to 
exclusively limiting the study to a specific country. Hence, our policy implications will have 
a broader scope. Second, the research is concerned with primary education because this level 
of education has been documented to be associated with more development externalities 
when economies are at initial levels of industrialization (Asiedu 2014; Asongu and 
Nwachukwu 2018b). Third, contrary to the qualitative approach used the Abugre, our 
empirical strategy is based on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Quantile regression (QR) 
estimations. The advantages of these techniques are clarified in the methodology section. 
Accordingly, the QR technique articulates existing levels of education quality or class sizes5. 
Fourth, we are concerned with all dimensions of governance documented in the World 
Governance Indicators of the World Bank, notably: (i) political governance which is 
understood as the election and replacement of political leaders (measured with “voice & 
accountability” and political stability/no violence); (ii) economic governance (proxied by 
government effectiveness and regulation quality) and understood as the formulation and 
implementation of policies that deliver public commodities and (iii) institutional governance 
which is defined as the respect by the State and citizens of institutions that govern 
interactions between them (appreciated with corruption-control and the rule of law). The 
conception and definitions of these variables are in accordance with recent governance 
literature (Andrés et al. 2015; Ajide and Raheem 2016a, 2016b; Asongu and Nwachukwu 
2017b).  Moreover, it is important to note that, this study is focusing on governance of 
nation-states instead “governance of organization” as used in Aburgre (2018).  
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In the light of the above, the research question this study aims to answer is the 
following: how does governance affect education quality in sub-Saharan Africa? The 
connection between governance and education quality is intuitively sound because, building 
on the aforementioned conceptions and definitions of governance dynamics, poor governance 
quality is very likely to affect the ability of government to provide good quality education. 
For instances: (i) unsound political governance that is characterized by political instability, 
violence and absence of “voice and accountability” can reduce the quality of education; (ii) 
given that education quality is a public good, it is natural to expect economic governance to 
affect it and (iii) the absence of impunity and high levels of corruption can also influence the 
ability of government to deliver this public good of quality education. The intuitions 
underlying these theoretical relationships are sound and logical. Moreover, the positive nexus 
between governance and education is consistent with the attendant literature (Stasavage 
2005a, 2005b; Mani and Mukand 2007; Harding and Stasavage 2014; Kosack 2012; Croke et 
al. 2016; Larreguy and Marshall 2017; Harding 2019).  Hence, while we are conscious of the 
risks of doing measurement without an established theoretical framework, we also strongly 
argue that applied econometrics that is motivated by sound intuition is a useful scientific 
activity. Hence, the research is consistent with a strand of empirical literature which argues 
that applied econometrics should not be exclusively limited to the acceptance and rejection of 
existing theoretical frameworks (Costantini and Lupi 2005; Narayan et al. 2011;  Asongu and 
Nwachukwu 2016a). This is essentially because theory-building empirical exercises are also 
worthwhile in scholarly and policy circles.   
The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 focuses on the data and 
methodology, while Section 3 presents and discusses the empirical results. Section 4 
concludes with implications and future research directions.  
 
2. Historical perspective, governance and educational quality  
2.1 Historical perspective  
The historical perspective on education in Africa mainly builds on Fourie (2016). According 
to the narrative, many countries in Africa are currently characterized by low levels of 
education. For example, Fourie (2016) maintains that the average literacy rate in Sub-Saharan 
Africa is 62%, which is lower than the world’s average of 84%. These literacy rates are 
respectively, 31%, 42%, 56%, 89%, 92% and 94% in Mali, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Namibia, Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea.  In order to understand the reasons behind the 
comparatively poor performance of African countries in education, a chronology of historical 
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insights is presented in two main strands, notably, the influence of colonizers and 
independence. Learning in Africa was largely influenced by the colonizers Fourie (2016). A 
notable influence pertains to the effect of the discoveries of Livingstone related to the interior 
of Africa, which helped some European nations to colonize African countries and use them to 
their benefit. Moreover, according to the narrative, the project of colonization in the early 20th 
century had both favorable and unfavorable consequences on Africa’s education. With 
respect to the influence of independence, it is worthwhile to emphasize that after the Second 
World War, as colonizers from Europe started to notice that their legitimization and 
principles had fundamentally changed in terms of colonial governance, they quickly realized 
that they could no longer hold power for long. In most African countries, independence from 
colonizers occurred largely between the 1950s and 1960s. Formal educational structures 
progressed significantly in the post-independence era because of the need to train locals who 
could be administrators and drive economic development (Fourie, 2016). It follows that there 
was a kind of revolution in the aftermath of independence because new political leaders 
largely invested in providing qualified teachers and building new schools. Hence, literacy 
rates massively increased after independence.  
 
2.2 Governance and educational quality 
To the best of our knowledge, the extant literature pertaining to the nexus between 
governance and education has largely focused on higher education. Moreover, a substantial 
bulk of the attendant literature has not been oriented towards Africa (Materu 2007; Coates 
2010; Bloom et al. 2005; Henard and Mitterle 2010; Dao 2015; Logli 2016; Yirdaw 2016). 
 Coates (2010) provides insights into defining and monitoring academic standards in 
higher education institutions in Australia. According to the author, it is relevant to engage 
quality-focused leadership with governments, regulatory agencies as well as with other actors 
who are tasked with monitoring education quality. Standards of monitoring and the ability to 
meet requirements of accreditation exert some influence on boosting education quality in 
institutions and academic excellence centres.  
 Materu (2007) in an earlier study had assessed the issues surrounding equality in 
institutions of higher learning in Africa and established that the dichotomy pertaining to 
political pressure on the part of the government to increase access to institutions and the aim 
of institutions to increase standards of learning, have led to a favorable culture of educational 
quality in higher institutions of the continent. These characteristics of educational quality 
entail, inter alia: retention of human capital, enhanced transparency and improved 
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accountability in relation to quality assurance. Moreover, the author identified good 
governance as a fundamental driver of the quality of higher education in the continent. The 
assertion is consistent with Henard and Mitterle (2010) who have also established that 
governance is vital for the progress and sustainability of quality education in higher 
institutions of learning in Africa.  In essence, the effect of political interference and 
regulation represents a considerable challenge to higher education, especially within the 
framework of the economically marginalized and politically dynamic African continent. 
These reflections are broadly consistent with an earlier position by Bloom et al. (2005) who 
elicited the existing paradox underpinning the legislation of education in Africa. According to 
the author, policies that are highly centralized limit the autonomy of universities and by 
extension politicize them, which ultimately subvert the experience of learning in reaction to 
objectives of political nature.   
 Within a country-oriented perspective, the documented relevance of governance in 
driving education quality is consistent with Yirdaw (2016) on a study in Ethiopia. The author 
identifies leadership and governance factors in Ethiopia’s private educational institutions to 
conclude that the attendant institutions are constantly poised in a challenging environment (of 
underfunding, poor infrastructure, lack of qualified teachers, inter alia) to balance 
stakeholder requirements with the demands of the government. Moreover, the researcher also 
showed that the majority of educational leaders are of the opinion that addressing education 
quality can be improved by more effective governance. Recommendations provided by the 
author urge policy makers, leaders of higher education institutions and regulators to, inter 
alia provide: adequate infrastructure, more equitable regulation, better qualified instructors 
and proper enforcement of education quality in higher institutions of learning.  
 Dao (2015) investigate the principal issues of reform pertaining to governance, 
insurance quality and finance in higher education in Vietnam. The author concludes that 
reforms at the university are slow and setbacks both at national and institutional levels are 
limiting the quality of education in the country.  The conclusions of Dao (2015) are broadly 
consistent with Logli (2015) from the perspective of higher education in Indonesia.   
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
The study is based on a panel of 49 countries in SSA using data for the period 2000-2012 
from various sources, notably: World Governance Indicators and World Development 
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Indicators of the World Bank. The sample and periodicity are constrained by data availability 
at the time of the study.   
 The outcome indicator is poor education quality, which is measured with the “pupil-
teacher ratio” in primary education. This dependent variable is a negative economic signal 
given that a higher ratio of the variable is a reflection of poor education quality. This is 
essentially because a lower ratio reflects better education quality since fewer pupils are 
instructed by the same teacher. Hence, it offers the teacher the opportunity to allocate more 
time for the imparting of knowledge to these pupils. This indicator of education quality has 
been used in recent literature on education in Africa (Asongu and Nwachukwu 2016b; 
Tchamyou 2020; Asongu and Odhiambo 2019a).  
 In addition to the motivation for adopting a measurement of primary education 
provided in the introduction (i.e. the need to depart from the study of Abugre and articulate 
primary education which is more associated with development externalities when countries 
are at initial levels of industrialization), the corresponding indicators from tertiary and 
secondary education quality are characterized by limited degrees of freedom.  
 Consistent with insights from the introduction, all the governance dynamics provided 
by the World Governance Indicators of the World Bank are used in this analysis. These 
dynamics entail: (i) political governance (measured with “voice & accountability” and 
political  governance/no violence) and defined as the election and replacement of political 
leaders in a country; (ii) economic governance (proxied by government effectiveness and 
regulation quality), which is understood as the formulation and implementation of policies 
that deliver public commodities in a country and (iii) institutional governance (measured with 
corruption-control and the rule of law), defined as the respect by the State and citizens of 
institutions that govern interactions between them. These conceptions and definitions are 
consistent with recent governance literature in Africa (Asongu and Nwachukwu 2016c). It is 
important to note that the study uses all the six governance indicators provided by the World 
Governance Indicators of the World Bank because to the best our knowledge these are the 
most widely used governance indicators in the literature. Moreover, the intuition for the 
connection between the six governance indicators and education quality is discussed in the 
introduction. 
 In order to account for variable omission basis, seven control variables are adopted in 
accordance with education literature (Asiedu 2014; Asongu and Odhiambo 2019b). These 
include three dummy and four non-dummy variables. The non-dummy variables are: foreign 
direct investment (FDI), internet penetration, trade openness and Gross Domestic Product 
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(GDP) per capita. These variables are expected to provide enabling conditions for quality 
education. The dummy variables are: low income, English common law and conflict-affected 
countries. The research anticipates that low income and conflict-affected countries are 
negatively related to quality education compared to respectively, higher income and conflict-
free countries.  Accordingly, high-income countries are associated with more resources with 
which to provide more quality education to their citizens. Moreover, the presence of conflicts 
limits the avenues by which resources can be mobilised and allocated efficiently to improve 
education quality. In the light of the extant literature, compared to French civil law countries, 
English common law countries have been established to be more associated with better levels 
of education (Agbor 2015) and human development (Asongu and Nwachukwu 2018c). 
 The categorisation of countries by legal origins is in accordance with La Porta et al. 
(2008, 289) whereas the segmentation of countries by income levels is in line with the World 
Bank’s classification of income groups6.  In accordance with Asongu et al.(2019), conflict-
affected countries are those that have experienced civil conflicts for at least half of the 
periodicity being investigated.  
With respect to non-dummy variables, they have been established to enhance 
conditions for economic development and the wellbeing of citizens, including education (Sun 
and He 2014; Tchamyou 2017; Asongu and Tchamyou 2019). For  instances:  
(i) According to Sun and He (2014), foreign direct investment improves human capital. 
Accordingly, foreign investment is accompanied by requirements for more domestic human 
capital in terms of quality and quantity in order to meet demands in human resources relevant 
in the implementation and management of attendant foreign investment projects. This could 
constraint the domestic educational system to reduce the “pupil-teacher ratio” in view of 
providing higher quality education.  
(ii) Information technology such as the internet is a fundamental determinant of knowledge 
economy and learning in Africa (Tchamyou 2017). Electricity supply is not considered in the 
study. It is assumed that internet penetration is also associated with electricity supply because 
the latter is needed for the former to work properly. 
(iii) Trade openness has been documented to affect education and lifelong learning (Asongu 
and Tchamyou 2019). Consistent with the narrative on foreign investment above, more 
exchanges in imports and exports of goods and services evidently have some incidence on 
                                                          
6There are four main World Bank income groups: (i) high income, $12,276 or more; (ii) upper middle income, 




human capital related to the underlying trade transactions. Owing to competition associated 
with trade openness, direct and indirect constraints can be exerted on the quality of human 
resources such that the education systems are improved to take on board more teachers in 
order to improve education quality by means of decreasing the “pupil-teacher ratio”.  
 (iv) The wealth of nations naturally should affect education standards because rich countries 
have more resources with which to improve education facilities (Asongu and Tchamyou 
2020).  
The definitions and sources of the variables are provided in Appendix 1, whereas the 
summary statistics is disclosed in Appendix 2. The correlation matrix is provided in 
Appendix 3.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
 Two empirical strategies are adopted in this study. They include:  (i) baseline 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and (ii) Quantile regressions. The OLS and QR approaches are 
also tailored to account for the unobserved heterogeneity in terms of the dummy control 
variables. The employment of these estimation approaches for a given problem statement in 
order to provide more robust results is consistent with recent literature (Asongu et al. 2018).  
 
3.2.1 Ordinary Least Squares  
 
The OLS specification with Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) 






,   

(1) 
where tiEd , is the poor education quality of country i  in period t ; is a constant,W  is the 
vector of determinants which includes governance dynamics (i.e. political, economic and 
institutional) and the seven control variables (FDI, internet penetration, trade openness and 
GDP per capita,  low income, English common law and conflicts) and ti ,  the error term .  
 
3.2.2 Quantile regressions 
 The OLS technique discussed in the previous section is characterized by the 
shortcoming of focusing on mean values of poor education quality. However, the effect of 
governance on poor education quality may be contingent on initial levels of poor education 
quality such that the effect of governance dynamics varies across countries with low, 
intermediate and high levels of poor education quality. In order to remedy the concern, the 
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QR approach is used (Okada and Samreth 2012; Asongu 2013; Koenker and Bassett 1978; 
Tchamyou and Asongu 2018). Moreover, consistent with Koenker (2005) and Hao and 
Naiman (2007), the QR approach distinguishes itself from linear regressions in many ways, 
notably, it: (i) is based on conditional quantiles (against the conditional mean); requires 
sufficient data (against the OLS approach which can accommodate a smaller dataset); is 
consistent with an agnostic distribution (against a normal distribution); is computationally 
more intensive (versus a linear technique which is computationally less intensive) and is 
robust to the control of outliers (versus sensitivity to outliers). Accordingly, nonlinear 
regressions have been substantially documented to improve the policy relevance of studies 
(Shin et al. 2014; Sadik-Zada et al. 2019a, 2019b; Sadik-Zada 2020; Sadik-Zada and Ferrari 
2020; Niklas and  Sadik-Zada 2019; Sadik-Zada and Loewenstein 2020).  
The  th quantile estimator of poor education quality is obtained by solving for the 
following optimization problem, which is presented in Eq. (2) without subscripts for the 
purpose of readability and simplicity.   





























,                                          (2)
 
where  1,0 . As opposed to OLS which is based on the minimization of the sum of 
squared residuals, with QR, it is the weighted sum of absolute deviations that is minimized. 
For example, the 25th or 75th quantiles (with  =0.25 or 0.75, respectively) are estimated by 
approximately weighing the residuals. The conditional quantile of poor quality of education 
or iy given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(   ,                                                                                                        (3) 
where unique slope parameters are estimated for each  th specific quantile. This formulation 
is analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are examined only at the 
mean of the conditional distribution of poor education quality. For Eq. (3), the outcome 
variable iy  is the poor quality of education whereas ix  contains: a constant term, governance 
dynamics, FDI inflows, foreign aid, internet, low income, English common law and conflicts. 
 Consistent with Asongu and Odhiambo (2019c), in the light of the above, separate 
regression equations of the QR and OLS for the research question being investigated are as 
follows. 













ti XEd                                                                      (5) 
The OLS and QR respectively in Equation (4) and Equation (5) above focus on the role of 
governance dynamics on the poor quality of education, where, tiEd , is the poor quality of 
education in  country i  in  period t , 0 is a constant, X entails governance dynamics and 
other control variables (FDI, internet penetration, trade openness, GDP per capita,  low 
income, English common law and conflicts)  and ti , is the error term.  
 
4. Empirical results  
 The empirical findings are presented in this section. Whereas the OLS findings are 
disclosed in Table 1, results from QR are presented in Table 2 and Table 3. When interpreting 
the findings, it is worthwhile to note that a positive relationship with the outcome variable 
indicates a negative nexus with the quality of education whereas a negative relationship with 
on the outcome variable reflects a positive nexus with on the quality of education. This is 
essentially because education quality is conceived and measured as a negative economic 
signal. Hence, an increasing “pupils teacher ratio” is indicative of diminishing education 
quality since ceteris paribus; teachers need to allocate more time to the teaching and 
attending to pupils being taught.  
 The following findings can be established from Table 1. (i) All governance variables 
are positively related with education quality, with the following order of increasing 
magnitude: political stability, the rule of law, regulation quality, “voice & accountability”, 
government effectiveness and corruption-control. (ii) The significant control variables have 
the expected signs.  
 In order to assess whether the differences in magnitude are significant in the light of 
concerns from in the attendant literature (Gelman and Stern 2006), following Van Beer and 
Zand (2014) a standard one-tailed z test is used to compare the estimated governance 
coefficients in the corresponding specifications. Building on Clogg et al. (1995) and 
Paternoster et al. (1998), the relevant z-statistics is calculated as in Equation (6):  
 








                                                                                                           (6) 
 
where b1 and b2 are the estimated coefficients associated with the two sub-samples, and σb1 
and σb2 are the standard errors. The findings provided in Appendix 4 and Appendix 5 show 
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that the estimate of political stability is significantly different from the other governance 
estimates at the 1% and 5% significance levels.  
 
Table 1: Ordinary Least Squares  
       
 Dependent variable: Poor  Education Quality (Pupil teacher ratio in primary education) 
 Political Governance Economic  Governance Institutional Governance 
       
Constant  49.577*** 45.851*** 45.803*** 46.546*** 46.711*** 47.227*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Political Stability -1.609** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.040)      
Voice & Accountability  --- -4.818*** --- --- --- --- 
  (0.000)     
Government Effectiveness --- --- -5.296*** --- --- --- 
   (0.000)    
Regulation Quality --- --- --- -4.483*** --- --- 
    (0.000)   
Rule of Law --- --- --- --- -4.292*** --- 
     (0.000)  
Corruption-Control --- --- --- --- --- -5.841*** 
      (0.000) 
Foreign Direct Investment  -0.022 -0.039 -0.074 -0.057 -0.059 -0.067 
 (0.797) (0.626) (0.411) (0.507) (0.499) (0.451) 
Internet Penetration  -0.082*** -0.065*** -0.067*** -0.075*** -0.071*** -0.066*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Trade Openness   -0.088*** -0.098*** -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.087*** -0.096*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP per Capita growth 0.251 0.332* 0.331* 0.281 0.282 0.263 
 (0.141) (0.056) (0.066) (0.114) (0.116) (0.120) 
Low Income  4.436*** 6.569*** 4.838*** 5.513*** 4.868*** 3.926*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
English Common law 0.089 1.356 1.603 1.422 1.008 0.957 
 (0.943) (0.273) (0.190) (0.246) (0.430) (0.443) 
Conflicts  4.294** 3.678** 4.477** 4.809*** 3.933** 4.881*** 
 (0.020) (0.035) (0.012) (0.000) (0.032) (0.007) 
       
R² 0.367 0.400 0.391 0.383 0.382 0.399 
Fisher 40.21*** 51.04*** 48.14*** 45.29*** 48.11*** 47.70*** 
Observations  386 386 386 386 386 386 
       
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Low income: Low income countries. 
























Table 2: Quantile regressions for political and economic governance  
           
 Dependent variable: Poor Education Quality (Pupil teacher ratio in primary education) 
           
 Panel A: Political Governance 
           
 Political Stability Voice & Accountability 
           
 Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
           
Constant  33.651*** 42.910*** 49.297*** 52.601*** 66.298*** 30.748*** 38.899*** 44.742**/ 49.729*** 60.167*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Political Stability -1.962* -3.463*** -2.202** -1.187 -4.939* --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.063) (0.000) (0.022) (0.408) (0.046)      
Voice & Accountability  --- --- --- --- --- -3.831*** -5.084*** -5.814*** -4.051** -4.218 
      (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.229) 
Foreign Direct Investment  -0.002 -0.038 -0.145 0.220 0.283 -0.001 -0.048 -0.099 0.235 0.162 
 (0.982) (0.573) (0.145) (0.140) (0.293) (0.985) (0.533) (0.297) (0.104) (0.604) 
Internet Penetration  -0.058*** -0.054*** -0.067*** -0.076*** -0.111***   -0.039*** -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.065*** -0.083** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.026) 
Trade Openness   -0.045 -0.082*** -0.090*** -0.082*** -0.106* -0.057*** -0.091*** -0.125*** -0.104*** -0.111* 
 (0.049) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.057) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.084) 
GDP per Capita growth -0.090 -0.191* 0.220 0.244 0.753* 0.022 0.158 0.330** 0.401* 0.886 
 (0.610) (0.080) (0.172) (0.310) (0.084) (0.887) (0.209) (0.034) (0.089) (0.083) 
Low Income  4.454*** 1.890* 1.923 4.370** 7.620* 6.250*** 4.351*** 4.878*** 6.956*** 8.961* 
 (0.006) (0.058) (0.192) (0.047) (0.055) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.063) 
English Common law 0.256 -1.622* 1.071 3.027 -3.453 3.061** 0.794 3.163** 2.750 1.582 
 (0.870) (0.095) (0.456) (0.158) (0.371) (0.030) (.0456) (0.024) (0.197) (0.731) 
Conflicts  0.286 -1.111 2.332 9.619*** 17.529*** 0.025 1.399 3.969** 7.932*** 8.565 
 (0.893) (0.401) (0.233) (0.001) (0.001) (0.988) (0.320) (0.023) (0.003) (0.133) 
           
Pseudo R2 0.319 0.286 0.242 0.206 0.196 0.335 0.309 0.272 0.223 0.196 
Observations  386 386 386 386 386 386 386 386 386 386 
           
           
 Panel B: Economic Governance 
           
 Government Effectiveness Regulation Quality 
           
 Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
           
Constant  33.247*** 36.732*** 44.494*** 49.790*** 53.388*** 35.106*** 37.756*** 46.642*** 49.456*** 57.262*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Government Effectiveness -1.992 -5.741*** -6.704*** -5.892*** -12.247*** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.164) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)      
Regulation Quality --- --- --- --- --- -1.174 -4.798*** -4.454*** -7.343*** -9.277** 
      (0.339) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.011) 
Foreign Direct Investment  -0.012 -0.225*** -0.199* 0.290* -0.024 0.008 -0.125 -0.183* 0.259* 0.158 
 (0.902) (0.003) (0.050) (0.072) (0.915) (0.920) (.0.161) (0.071) (0.070) (0.552) 
Internet Penetration  -0.059*** -0.048*** -0.042*** -0.058 -0.067** -0.065*** -0.064*** -0.059*** -0.058*** -0.079*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) 
Trade Openness   -0.054*** -0.073*** -0.110*** -0.119*** -0.064 -0.065*** -0.072*** -0.108*** -0.130*** -0.120** 
 (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.166)) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.027) 
GDP per Capita growth -0.024 0.127 0.335** 0.358 0.809** -0.061 -0.013 0.374** 0.328 0.673 
 (0.881) (0.296) (0.040) (0.169) (0.029) (0.671) (0.923) (0.022) (0.152) (0.117) 
Low Income  4.952*** 4.668*** 3.480** 4.831** 2.670 5.000*** 4.809*** 3.578** 5.231** 0.673 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.018) (0.039) (0.423) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.03) (0.117) 
English Common law 0.720 2.719** 3.559** 3.986* 2.869 -0.304 1.976 3.625** 4.794** 6.372 
 (0.638) (0.016) (0.018) (0.097) (0.400) (0.821) (0.139) (0.018) (0.025 (0.107) 
Conflicts  1.671 0.824 2.405 8.038*** 10.629*** 1.417 1.851 2.572 9.234*** 4.801 
 (0.359) (0.539) (0.179) (0.005) (0.009) (0.732) (0.240) (0.151) (0.000) (0.230) 
           
Pseudo R2 0.320 0.294 0.255 0.220 0.216 0.314 0.274 0.248 0.227 0.215 
Observations  386 386 386 386 386 386 386 386 386 386 
           
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify 
nations where poor  education quality is least. Low income: Low income countries. English: English common law countries. Conflict: 
Conflict-affected countries.  
 
 
The following findings can be established for Tables 2-3. Panel A of Table 2 shows findings 
for political governance, whereas Panel B discloses results of economic governance. In the 
interpretation of the results, a note should be taken of the fact that since we have a negative 
signal as the outcome variable, the lowest quantile (i.e. Q 0.10) reflects countries with the 
highest education quality whereas the highest quantile (i.e. Q 0.90) denotes countries the least 
education quality. First, with the exception of the 75th (90th) quantile, political stability (Voice 
& accountability) consistently have a positive relationship with education quality in a non-
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monotonic pattern throughout the conditional distribution of education quality. Second, 
economic governance (i.e. government effectiveness and regulation quality) and the rule of 
law, consistently have a positive correlation with education quality, with the exception of the 
lowest quantile in which the nexus is not significant.  The pattern is also non-monotonic.  
Third, corruption-control consistently has a positive nexus with the quality of education with 
a monotonic pattern throughout the conditional distribution of poor education quality. 
Accordingly, the negative responsiveness of poor education quality to corruption-control 
increases as poor education quality increases. In other words, given that the 90th quantile is 
actually the lowest level of education quality, corruption-control has the biggest effects when 
poor equality education is highest. Fourth, most of the significant control variables have the 
expected signs.   
 
Table 3: Quantile regressions for institutional governance  
           
 Dependent variable: Poor Education Quality (Pupil teacher ratio in primary education) 
           
 Rule of Law Corruption-Control 
           
 Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
           
Constant  35.106*** 37.756*** 46.642*** 49.456*** 57.262*** 36.104*** 40.466*** 43.996*** 52.639*** 64.449*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rule of Law -1.174 -4.798*** -4.454*** -7.343*** -9.277** --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.339) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.011)      
Corruption-Control --- --- --- --- --- -2.510* -6.204*** -7.456*** -8.709*** -10.643*** 
      (0.091) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) 
Foreign Direct Investment  0.008 -0.125 -0.183* 0.259* 0.158 -0.031 -0.159** -0.197** 0.343*** 0.190 
 (0.920) (0.161) (0.071) (0.070) (0.552) (0.776) (0.016) (0.033) (0.000) (0.495) 
Internet Penetration  -0.065*** -0.064*** -0.059*** -0.058*** -0.079*** -0.061*** -0.047*** -0.043*** -0.055*** -0.062* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.057) 
Trade Openness   -0.065*** -0.072*** -0.108*** -0.130*** -0.120** -0.069*** -0.079*** -0.096*** -0.139*** -0.161*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.027) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) 
GDP per Capita growth 0.061 -0.013 0.374** 0.328 0.673 -0.026 -0.027 0.191 0.311 0.492 
 (0.671) (0.923) (0.022) (0.152) (0.117) (0.880) (0.795) (0.198) (0.140) (0.272) 
Low Income  5.000*** 4.809*** 3.578** 5.231** 6.372 3.775** 1.742* 2.789** 0.765 1.745 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.013) (0.107) (0.018) (0.072) (0.040) (0.690) (0.669) 
English Common law -0.304 1.976 3.625** 4.794** 4.801 0.525 1.041 3.263** 4.358** 2.272 
 (0.821) (0.139) (0.018) (0.025) (0.230) (0.738) (0.273) (0.015) (0.021) (0.572) 
Conflicts  1.417 1.851 0.151 9.234*** 9.245* 0.895 1.923* 4.628*** 6.771*** 10.974** 
 (0.372) (0.240) (2.572) (0.000) (0.050) (0.639) (0.097) (0.005) (0.003) (0.025) 
           
Pseudo R2 0.314 0.274 0.248 0.227 0.215 0.326 0.308 0.275 0.230 0.209 
Observations  386 386 386 386 386 386 386 386 386 386 
           
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify 
nations where poor education quality is least. Low income: Low income countries. English: English common law countries. Conflict: 
Conflict-affected countries.  
 
 
One consistent finding that stands out is the importance of corruption-control in 
fighting poor education quality. This is essentially because, from OLS, corruption-control has 
the highest negative relationship, and from QR, the negative correlation of corruption-control 
increases with increasing levels of poor education quality. The relative importance of 
corruption-control compared to other governance dynamics is consistent with recent African 
contemporary literature, notably, in: fighting software piracy (Asongu and Andrés 2013); 
battling conflicts and crimes (Asongu and Kodila-Tedika 2016) and stifling capital flight 
16 
 
(Asongu and Nwachukwu 2017c). It is worthwhile the further discuss why corruption-control 
is the best mechanism compared to other governance dynamics.  
There are two main explanations as to why corruption-control is the most effective 
governance weapon in fighting poor education quality, notably: (i) a “conceptual” elucidation 
and (ii) the pragmatism of corruption-control in governance as a final phase (last resort or end 
game). First, within the conceptual framework, other dimensions of governance are not as 
important as the rate at which public power and commodities are prevented from being 
diverted for private gain (i.e. corruption-control) when it comes to improving education 
quality. In essence, this dimension of  corruption-control in governance is more relevant than: 
(i) the degree by which citizens in a country can participate in the decision making processes 
of political nature (i.e. voice & accountability); (ii) the stability of government in relation to 
terrorism and political violence (i.e. political stability/no violence); (iii) the capacity of 
government to take action in implementing measures that uphold the credibility of the 
government (i.e. government effectiveness); (iv) the ability of the government to formulate 
and put in place sound measures that boost participation in the private sector (i.e. regulation 
quality); and (v) the presence a legal system (which entails property rights) and contract 
enforcement (i.e. the rule of law ).  
Second, corruption-control is the most effective governance mechanism in boosting 
education quality because it is like the last resort or end game in the process of boosting 
education standards. For instance, leaders could be elected into office by democratic 
standards (at times through vote-buying and -rigging), measures for boosting education may 
be voted into law by the legislature, the executive branch of government can formulate and 
implement policies in the light of the legislative measure, but if those implementing policies 
are corrupt, they can divert the allocated funds for private gains. Even at the level of the 
judiciary, judges need to be incorruptible in order for corrupt officials to go without impunity.  
In summary, it is only when corruption has been substantially mitigated that, inter 
alia: (i)good and credible leaders be voted into office, (ii) genuine laws voted by the 
legislature and implemented by the executive, (iii) corrupt officials caught siphoning funds 
allocated to improve education quality brought to face justice and (iv) the judiciary 
impartially sentencing corrupt officials to terms of jail in order to deter other corrupt officials 







5. Concluding implications and future research directions 
 
This paper has examined the relevance of good governance in decreasing poor quality 
education in a panel of 49 sub-Saharan African countries over the period 2000-2012. 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Quantile regression (QR) have been employed as 
estimation strategies. Two factors are worthwhile in the interpretation of results. On the one 
hand, the proxy for education quality (i.e. “pupil-teacher ratio”) is a negative signal such that 
higher ratios denote education of poorer quality. On the other hand, in the QR, the lowest 
quantile (i.e. Q 0.10) reflects countries with the highest education quality whereas the highest 
quantile (i.e. Q .90) denotes countries the least education quality. The following findings 
have been established. First, from the OLS, governance variables are positively related to 
education quality, with the following order of increasing magnitude: political stability, the 
rule of law, regulation quality, “voice & accountability”, government effectiveness and 
corruption-control. Second, with regards to QR: (i) with the exception of the 75th (90th) 
quantile, political stability (voice & accountability) consistently has a negative relationship 
with poor education quality with non-monotonic patterns throughout the conditional 
distribution of poor education quality. (ii) Economic governance (i.e. government 
effectiveness and regulation quality) and the rule of law, consistently has negative 
relationship with poor education quality, with the exception of the lowest quantile in which 
the nexus is not significant.  The pattern is also non-monotonic.  (iii) Corruption-control 
consistently is negatively linked to poor quality education with a monotonic pattern 
throughout the conditional distribution of poor education quality. Implications for policy are 
discussed in terms of the absence of significant results in the lowest quantiles and corruption-
control as the most effective governance tool in promoting quality education in the light of 
the SDGs. 
 First, the absence of significant findings between governance and poor education 
quality in some quantiles is an indication that governance mechanisms are a necessary but not 
a sufficient condition for promoting education quality when initial levels of poor education 
quality are least. It follows that in modeling the importance of governance in the promoting 
of education quality, blanket policies (as established from OLS findings) may not be effective 
unless these policies are contingent on initial levels of poor education quality and by 




 Second, the relative importance of corruption-control in promoting quality education 
has been established at two levels. On the one hand, from the OLS regressions, corruption-
control has the highest magnitude on education quality. On the other hand, given that the 90th 
quantile is actually the lowest levels of education quality, corruption-control has the biggest 
effects when poor equality education is highest. As a policy implication, for the same levels 
of corruption-control, ceteris paribus, the potential effect in reducing poor education quality 
will be consistently higher in countries where initial levels of education quality are low. 
Hence, in the post-2015 development era, in order to promote quality education for the 
achievement of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 4 on global quality education for all, 
policy makers should improve governance standards with particular emphasis on the 
importance of corruption-control as the most important governance weapon in achieving 
global quality primary education.  
 Future studies can focus on country-specific cases in order to establish more targeted 
implications. Moreover, it is worthwhile also to consider alternative policy instruments with 
which to fight poor education quality in the sub-region.  While OLS and Quantile regressions 
which have been employed have led the study to conclude on correlations and relationships 
as opposed to causality, future studies should also consider alternative estimation techniques 
that account for temporal dependence in the sampled panel and simultaneity, in order to 
assess if the findings withstand empirical scrutiny within the framework of causality. For 
“time series”-oriented studies, Beck (2001) and Beck and Katz (1995) are worth consulting. 
In these future studies, it would be worthwhile to engage a recently released World Bank 
dataset on education quality (Altinok et al. 2018) as well as other governance at school 
measures. Such may require using primary data to provide complementary microeconomic 



















Appendix 1: Definitions and sources of variables  
    
Variables  Signs  Definitions  Sources 
Education Quality Educ Pupil teacher ratio in primary education  WDI 
    
 
Political  Stability  
 
PolS 
“Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured 
as the perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional and violent means, including 
domestic violence and terrorism”. 
 
 
       WGI 
    
 
Voice & Accountability  
 
VA 
“Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the 
extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government and to enjoy 











“Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the 
quality of public services, the quality and degree of 
independence from political pressures of the civil 
service, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of governments’ 
commitments to such policies”. 
 
WGI 
    
 
Regulation Quality  
 
RQ 
“Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the 
ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development”. 
 
WGI 
    
 
 




“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, the 











“Control of corruption (estimate): captures 
perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and 
grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the 
state by elites and private interests” 
 
WGI 
    
Foreign Investment  FDI Foreign Direct Investment Inflows (% of GDP) WDI 
    
Internet penetration  Internet Internet  subscriptions (per 1000 people) WDI 
    
Trade Openness  Trade Exports + Imports of commodities  (% of GDP) WDI 
    
GDP per capita growth GDPpcg GDP per capita growth (annual %) WDI 
    













Appendix 2: Summary statistics 
      
 Mean  SD Min Max Obs 
Education Quality  43.601 14.529 12.466 100.236 444   
Political  Stability  -0.543 0.956 -3.323 1.192 578 
Voice & Accountability  -0.646 0.737 -2.233 0.990 578 
Government Effectiveness -0.771 0.620 -2.450 0.934 577 
Regulation Quality  -0.715 0.644 -2.665 0.983 578 
Rule of Law -0.741 0.662 -2.668 1.056 578 
Corruption-Control -0.642 0.591 -1.924 1.249 579 
Net Foreign Direct Investment Inflows 5.332 8.737 -6.043 91.007 603 
Internet penetration  41.528 64.506 0.059 436.051 566 
Trade Openness  78.177 36.138 20.964 209.874 597 
GDP per capita growth 2.198 5.987 -49.761 58.363 608 
      
SD: Standard deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations.  
 
 
Appendix 3: Correlation matrix (uniform sample size:  386 ) 
            
 Governance variables Control variables  
Edu PolS VA GE RQ RL CC FDI Internet Trade GDPpcg  
1.000 -0.373 -0.344 -0.370 -0.272 -0.395 -0.402 -0.106 -0.491 -0.357 0.027 Edu 
 1.000 0.666 0.648 0.572 0.792 0.656 0.017 0.375 0.280 0.016 PolS 
  1.000 0.777 0.575 0.813 0.644 -0.035 0.392 0.077 0.142 VA 
   1.000 0.867 0.893 0.813 -0.096 0.429 0.098 0.144 GE 
    1.000 0.801 0.681 -0.104 0.289 0.070 0.084 RQ 
     1.000 0.829 -0.062 0.440 0.198 0.082 RL 
      1.000 -0.098 0.426 0.058 0.035 CC 
       1.000 0.047 0.336 0.165 FDI 
        1.000 0.214 0.087 Internet 
         1.000 0.080 Trade 
          1.000 GDPpcg 
            
Edu: Education Quality. PolS: Political Stability. VA: Voice & Accountability. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulation Quality. 
CC: Corruption-Control. RL: Rule of Law. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth.  
 
Appendix 4: Testing for differences in estimated coefficients in Table 1 (Stage 1) 
       
 PolS VA GE RQ RL CC 
Estimates  -1.609 -4.818 -5.296 -4.483 -4.292 -5.841 
SE [0.782] [0.791] [1.227] [1.128] [1.175] [1.001] 
       
PolS ---      
VA 3.209/1.112 ---     
GE 3.687/1.455 0.478/1.459 ---    
RQ 2.874/1.372 0.335/1.377 0.813/1.666 ---   
RL 2.683/1.411 0.526/1.416 1.004/1.698 0.191/1.628 ---  
CC 4.232/1.270 1.023/1.275 0.545/1.583 1.358/1.508 1.549/1.543 --- 
       
SE: Standard Error. PolS: Political Stability. VA: Voice & Accountability. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: 
Regulation Quality. CC: Corruption-Control. RL: Rule of Law. The values from the 5th line are from the 








Appendix 5: Testing for differences in estimated coefficients in Table 1 (Stage 2) 
       
 PolS  VA GE RQ RL CC 
Estimates  -1.609 -4.818 -5.296 -4.483 -4.292 -5.841 
SE [0.782] [0.791] [1.227] [1.128] [1.175] [1.001] 
       
PolS ---      
VA 2.885** ---     
GE 2.534** 0.327 ---    
RQ 2.094* 0.243 0.487 ---   
RL 1.901* 0.371 0.591 0.117 ---  
CC 3.332** 0.802 0.344 0.900 1.003 --- 
       
SE: Standard Error. PolS: Political Stability. VA: Voice & Accountability. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: 
Regulation Quality. CC: Corruption-Control. RL: Rule of Law. 
* P< .05 (one tailed) 
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